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As activists in social movements, we live in the shadow of the “long 1968”, the wave of 
struggles that shook the world from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. This is as true in Prague 
or Derry, with their very different movement histories, as it is in Paris or Chicago, in Bologna 
or in Mexico City. How we challenge power today, what movements we ally with, how we 
think about possible futures and how we organise ourselves still depends on the decisive 
historical moment that was 1968. This article does not seek to celebrate (or condemn) 1968, 
but to understand a legacy which shapes our own movement landscapes – in order to be better 
able to think forward to another, more successful attempt at transformation. 
Introduction 
Across the “global North”, social movements after 1968 are often seen as different. The rise of 
a “new left” – together with the decisive decline of Stalinism and social democracy as 
perspectives for social change – marks this shift in political practice. So too does thinking about 
“social movements” as multiple, and the rise of what is now called “social movement studies”. 
More specifically, the decisive ground of politics has shifted from a strongly-institutionalised 
politics of interest groups and state-led economic development within a post-war, post-imperial 
settlement – whether the welfare state or corporatist arrangements of the old West, the 
authoritarian forms of “state socialism” of the old East, or the national-developmentalist 
models of post-colonial societies of what was then called the Third World, by analogy with the 
 
1 This paper draws on my work with Salar Mohandesi and Bjarke Risager for Voices of 1968 (Mohandesi et al. 
2018). Neither is responsible for the perspectives presented here. 
French Revolution’s Third Estate – towards a fundamental contestation of how decisions are 
made: or, in other words, of where power lies and where it should lie.  
The central roles of the nation state and the political party – which followed from the economic 
centrality of the individual state and its role as arbiter of distributional politics – have been 
displaced, not only by neoliberal globalisation but also by politics “below” and “beyond” the 
nation state. The acceptance of existing cultural hierarchies – centring the members of the 
“nation”, men and a stifling conformity to “normal” sexuality, “normal” bodies and minds, 
“mainstream” culture and so on – has been met with a fundamental questioning and remaking 
of everyday lives as well as with attempts to forcibly restore the earlier status quo. 
In much of the global North, 1968 marks a, if not the, decisive transition for social movements 
from the period of the “European civil war” (Pavone 2013) which reached its height between 
1916 and 1948. In that earlier period, the modern nation-state displaced the dynastic states of 
the Hohenzollerns, Romanovs and Hapsburgs, and the Ottoman Empire. The new states were 
forged by liberal-democratic, nationalist, peasant and workers’ movements in conflicts that 
reached their height in the revolutions of 1916–19, the fascist backlash from 1922–1945 (and 
later in Spain, Portugal and Greece), the European Resistance and the carve-up of the continent 
between the US and USSR (Thompson 1982). Today’s authoritarianisms in Poland and 
Hungary, Italy and Turkey dress up in the clothes of that period but have no new content to 
offer and no new states to create. The hope for the future, meanwhile, lies elsewhere – not in 
the creation of a new kind of state. These are not unusual observations, but they do beg the 
question of how and why this sort of change happens.  
1968, in fact, is not the only such transition in the shape of social movements. Some features 
of the period opened by 1968 can be found in the movements of earlier periods, for example 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries: not least the intensive dialogue between what later 
feminists would call “the personal and the political”; a counter-cultural challenge to the 
dominant culture including issues of gender and sexuality, politicised diasporas (in this earlier 
period Jewish, Irish, Polish, Italian among others), vegetarianism, alternative religions and 
radical education; significant waves of direct action; and a radical internationalism which 
sought to connect movement issues as well as movements across borders. We cannot, then, 
simply construct a universal historical shift from “before 1968” to “after 1968”.  
There were also multiple “worlds” of 1968. Struggles within the Eastern Bloc, the capitalist 
West and what by 1968 was mostly a post-colonial South took different forms. Even within 
any of these the trajectories and outcomes of movements were radically different: Italy as 
against Britain, Czechoslovakia as against Yugoslavia, Mexico as against India, even leaving 
aside awkward cases such as China or South Africa. How can we understand these divergences 
in other than ad hoc ways? These difficulties relate to a wider question in social movement 
research: how can we think about great waves of social movements and revolutions and at the 
same time try to understand the intervening periods of relative routine when dominant forces 
are able to contain struggle within a broadly stable normality?  
There are two intellectual traps to be avoided here. One is the temporal provincialism of 
identifying 1968 as the axial point in world history, a natural temptation for general (and 
sociological) commentators, but one which ignores the longer timeframe mentioned above. It 
also ignores the fact that in the Eastern Bloc 1968 had an important second act, in 1980–81 in 
Poland and 1989–90 everywhere – and that in much of the global South 1968 was itself the 
second act, following on and attempting to radicalise the moment of national independence. 
The long 1968, in other words, has to be situated in both time and space. 
The other trap is that of over-specialisation (or historical particularism), refusing to think 
through the relationships and comparisons between countries, between different movement 
waves, or between highpoints of struggle and periods of conservative tedium. In this picture 
most of the social world is taken for granted and all we are really thinking about is the foam – 
or at most the wave – on top of a deeper sea. This gives us an histoire événementielle which 
can explain nothing, because it does not ask how a wave of revolutions is produced out of a 
passive society, or how post-colonial Britain with its art-school hippies, the settler society of 
Northern Ireland with its grim struggles over local power, and the developing Maoist struggles 
of newly-independent India were connected as part of a single world system. 
This paper, then, attempts to relate “waves”, moments of social crisis and social movement 
landscapes in a systematic and hopefully organic way to illuminate the long 1968. Section I 
discusses how movements make history, the way in which social movement waves provoke 
organic crises. Section II discusses how history makes movements, the way in which the 
outcomes of crises shape movement landscapes. Finally, section III discusses the implications 
for social movements today in the shadow of 1968. 
Section I: Movements making history 
There is no general agreement on how to define, or explain, social movement waves or waves 
of revolutions2. There is, however, more agreement that such waves do in fact take place. Some 
waves are generally recognised as such: along with the long 1968, most authors would identify 
the Atlantic Revolutions (America, France, Haiti, Ireland), the revolutions of 1848, the period 
of 1916–23 (or its variants) as well as the year 1989 as waves of movements or revolutions, 
whatever their views on other periods and their assessment of the time and space boundaries 
of particular waves. 
Empirically, all such waves over the past 250 years have been focussed in particular regions of 
the world-system. I want to propose, firstly, that this fact can be explained in terms of the 
 
2 This section draws on Cox and Nilsen 2014. 
weaknesses of specific regional hegemonic arrangements – which is almost a tautology (how 
else could we assess the relative strength or weakness of particular arrangements?) Secondly, 
and again a near-tautology, I want to suggest that a sufficiently extensive and radical wave 
itself constitutes a crisis, and does not merely reflect one taking place somewhere else.  
These are not simply tautologies, however. Thinking about the situation in this way focusses 
our attention on the power relationships between collective social actors: the relationships of 
leadership, alliance, collusion, co-optation, clientelism, resignation or resistance which in these 
waves move from a perhaps fragile hegemony to a moment of crisis before being reconstituted 
in necessarily new ways, whether the new arrangement consists of a restoration on a different 
basis or a new revolutionary order. 
To unpack this somewhat: any long-term strategy for capital accumulation requires a relatively 
stable social order, as Gramsci taught us. At its simplest, this involves an actor leading the 
direction of social development (Touraine’s “historicity”, 1981) which has “horizontal” allies 
among other dominant actors constituting a general unity around this project, “vertical” support 
from (some) subaltern actors in return for material and/or symbolic concessions, the resignation 
of (other) subaltern actors and the coercion of yet others. Within each of these collective actors 
there is typically some contestation between those factions who see their interests as bound up 
with the current order and those who seek a better (for them) alternative; in normal 
circumstances, however, the factions supporting the hegemonic system of alliances are 
comfortably dominant. 
Any large-scale or radical movement mobilisation can disrupt this complicated arrangement. 
In 1968 we see this happening in several dimensions:  
• the emergence of new social actors; 
• previously coerced actors now mounting effective resistance;  
• previously resigned actors once again seeking to assert effective agency; 
• contestation within previously supportive actors, both subaltern and dominant. 
These changes successfully disrupted the existing hegemony in multiple states across the global 
North. As this sketch suggests, in a system of relationships change within a single collective 
actor involves a change of relationships to the others. Most dramatically, the actor which takes 
the lead in forcing the crisis is liable to be completely transformed by it, if indeed it survives 
at all, by virtue of the variety of new relationships which it enters into.  
To take two extreme contrasts, Italian student radicals and their organisations would go through 
radical transformations over the following decade in which individuals and networks 
nonetheless often remained consistently active from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s and 
beyond. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia similarly went through a dramatic 
transformation in the period 1967–68, from the shift towards reform to the purges following 
the Warsaw Pact invasion, in the process changing its relationship to popular forces and 
political reformers alike. 
Section II: History making movements 
“There have only been two world revolutions. One took place in 1848. The second took 
place in 1968. Both were historical failures. Both transformed the world”. 
Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein published these observations, rather unfortunately, in 1989. 
Their point was not so much about the location of these revolutions within the world-system 
or their structural impact as about how they shaped what I call movement landscapes. They go 
on to write: 
“In both cases… the political ground-rules of the world-system were profoundly and 
irrevocably changed as a result of the revolution. It was 1848 which institutionalized the 
old left (using this term broadly). And it was 1968 that institutionalised the new social 
movements. Looking forward, 1848 was in this sense the great rehearsal for the Paris 
Commune and the Russian Revolution, for the Baku Congress and Bandoeng. 1968 was 
the rehearsal for what?” (1989: 98) 
Specifically, their claim is about the state-centric nature of popular politics after 1848. For 1968 
they cite the successful containment of the radical left in the West, its degeneration in the East 
and the disappointments of national independence in the South – and the inherited weaknesses 
of the various old lefts of the period, which made them less and less plausible as bearers of 
hope for a new dawn. In other words, their claim is that the crisis of 1968 reshaped movement 
landscapes (the relationships within which movements are embedded) in very fundamental 
ways.  
It is possible to agree with this, and to prioritise these two dates as the key foundational 
moments of the old and new lefts and the modes of organising associated with them, while 
acknowledging the significance of other revolutionary waves. The Atlantic revolutions were 
the moment when the liberal-nationalist-democratic combination was – if not created, because 
it can be found in the English Revolution – formalised and generalised as the ideology that was 
exported southwards from the American Revolution, eastwards from the French Revolution, 
and in more subterranean ways around the world by the Haitian Revolution. The revolutionary 
wave of 1915–23 (starting with Ghadar, the Easter Rising and Petrograd) gave birth to a vision 
which married anti-colonialism, state-founding and the hope for development on the exploited 
periphery of the capitalist world system. In its core, the new wave of left energy and temporarily 
successful revolutions provoked the rise of fascism as a radical new way of organising popular 
mobilisation for elite purposes.  
The post-1945 independence struggles of Asia and Africa set up durable relationships (of 
alliance, subordination or coercion) between educated nationalist elites, peasant movements, 
urban workers and sometimes religious forces – as well as making promises of social change 
whose partial fulfilment would fuel the rebellions of the global South’s 1968. Lastly the “long 
1989” (from 1980 in Poland) was not only a second act of the earlier rebellions; it also marked 
a transition, often within the event itself, from the earlier perspective of radicalising the 
revolution or realising its real meaning (in this sense very similar to many global South 
perspectives). In countries like the GDR, the fact that struggles initially spearheaded by long-
time dissidents were taken over by emergent forces (at once naïve in relation to the unequal 
realities of life under capitalism and moving towards a fool’s nationalism encouraged by the 
west) led to a scorched-earth setting in which grassroots movements struggled to survive while 
the far right took over the streets.  
As can be seen, this paper develops and extends Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein’s argument 
in two stages. Section I argued that social movement waves (sometimes) provoke organic 
crises. In this section, I argue that the outcomes of such crises (almost always) reshape 
movement landscapes – although I take this world-revolutionary aspect, in their terms, as not 
being restricted to the very dramatic and widely shared transformations of movement 
landscapes following 1848 and 1968, but including at least the four other waves just mentioned. 
The concept of movement landscapes is intended to facilitate the historical-comparative 
analysis of specific (national, world-regional, local etc.) contexts. As the metaphor suggests, 
movement landscapes are internally interrelated, layered, historically constructed and 
boundaried. The implication is that it is a mistake to attempt to understand movements in 
isolation. Rather, we should try to see them as part of relationships of alliance, opposition, 
collusion, etc.  
Moreover, we should think these landscapes as being relatively long-lasting features which 
define “business as usual” in a given period between movement waves. This is not limited to 
the question of the relative centrality attributed to the local state and the modes of organising 
that follow from that. It also appears as the everyday assumptions that movement actors make 
about what they can achieve and what kind of goals are worth seeking; who their allies, 
potential patrons, easy audiences are; who are not plausible as allies or are de facto enemies; 
what issues are strategic; etc. It thus includes organising practicalities like whose votes can be 
counted on for which candidates; who jointly issues calls for demonstrations; which 
movements’ participants overlap; who shares a movement infrastructure; and so on.  
The origin of such landscapes, according to this analysis, is usually to be found in prior 
movement history, in particular in organic crises which “reshuffle the cards” around these 
relationships. We could contrast, for example, the relative significance of political and cultural 
radicalisms in shaping the west European and Anglophone movement landscapes of the long 
1968 and beyond. 
However, it is not only the crisis but also how it is resolved which is decisive here. As in 1848, 
the actors which were hegemonic prior to 1968 initially responded to the crisis with temporarily 
successful measures of coercion. Also as in 1848, they subsequently attempted to reconstitute 
hegemonic relationships on a new basis. This, however, only met with limited success. And in 
both cases, there was a remaking of states, of structures of popular consent and of economic 
strategies over several decades following the crisis. Neoliberalism would displace not only 
western organised capitalism but also eastern state socialism and southern national-
developmentalism, as the previously dominant factions within the leading social actors were 
displaced by new factions promoting new strategies built around new alliances: hegemonic 
relationships were rearranged not only above but also below (Lash and Urry 1987). 
The crisis of 1968 can be defined as organic, in that despite superpower support and temporarily 
effective coercion it was impossible to subsequently restore hegemonic relationships on the 
earlier basis. We can see this equally in the failed attempts to restore popular support for state 
socialism in Czechoslovakia, in de Gaulle’s brief Indian summer, and in the longer-term 
transformations symbolised in 1988 and 1989 by a world in which Michel Rocard and 
Alexander Dubček could take leading roles, however briefly. 
It was not inevitable that this crisis be resolved from above. Other such crises (the Atlantic 
Revolutions, 1916 or 1917, elements of the European Resistance, anti-colonial agitation) were 
resolved from below. The resolution from above, as Hilary Wainwright (1994) and others have 
shown, typically entailed the selective recuperation of some elements of “1968”, reconfigured 
as a consumerist claim for individual choice and as the partial inclusion of women, ethnic 
minorities, gays and lesbians etc. within the structures of neoliberalism.  
This reconstructed hegemony thus necessarily involved a shift in the leading group, its 
horizontal and vertical allies, and the construction of new boundaries around coercion and 
resignation. Since movements contested these processes, the remaking of movement 
landscapes did not simply transcribe generic elite strategies, as some accounts suggest. 
Consider, for example, the contrasting situation of the movements coming out of the US and 
Northern Irish civil rights movements vis-à-vis their local states.  
As the 1970s wore on, in western Europe at least, this reconstruction meant that individual 
movements were often increasingly pulled between more radical wings (oriented to alliances 
between movements from below) and more conservative wings (seeking inclusion, acceptance 
or at least tolerance within the newly-developing order). Movements thus had to rethink how 
they oriented themselves towards the new economic relationships, the new hegemony 
expressed within the state, and the new cultural hierarchies – or rather fight out, internally and 
externally, how they shaped their goals in relation to these. These conflicts shaped the struggles 
of the 1970s in particular, as the shapes of movement defeat and of the remade state became 
clear. 
 
Section III: The implications for movements today 
I want to conclude by noting that we are now well into a comparable period of organic crisis, 
as Alf Nilsen and I noted in 2014 . The crisis of consent of neoliberalism follows an earlier 
crisis of legitimacy forced from the left by the alterglobalisation movement, resistance to the 
US war on Iraq, anti-austerity struggles, and the complex movements of 2011 (indignad@s, 
Occupy and the Arab uprisings).  
In this period we saw a long stalemate which can be thought of in terms of an irresistible force 
(a wave of mobilisations which would have won in the 1990s) meeting an irresistible object 
(the structurally-embedded neoliberalism of the 2000s). As in 1968, the capacity of the existing 
hegemonic status quo to recover was real, but limited: it was enough to prevent a victory “from 
below and on the left”, but not to maintain popular consent and hence the strategic viability of 
the previous hegemonic project – in the current case, that of “progressive neoliberalism” 
(Fraser 2017).  
Unlike the twilight of Fordism and Stalinism, however, in the early 21st century there was no 
elite alternative ready and waiting, no real equivalent of the systematic and well-
institutionalised strategies and networks that underpinned the victory of neoliberalism in the 
1970s and 1980s. Figures to the right of progressive neoliberalism certainly exist (Murdoch, 
the Koch brothers and so on) but they lack a strategic vision of the new world they want. Hence 
the current period of experimentation – Gramsci speaks of “monsters” – in which different 
elite-led combinations (the many iterations of Trump’s administration, the rolling shambles 
that is Brexit and so on) seek to maintain their own personal interests at the head of temporary 
and ad hoc combinations of factions. We see not so much a new, coherent and concerted 
economic strategy (as in the early 1970s) but rather interest groups constituted within the earlier 
order which now seek to maintain short-term advantage and to find a political force capable of 
expressing that. 
In northern and eastern Europe, defection from the neoliberal alliance has mostly taken place 
to the right (with the important exceptions of Momentum, Nuit Debout and the Gilets Jaunes), 
reflecting the limited levels of popular organisation which movements from below have 
managed to achieve in these countries. Right-wing politicians focussing on the spectacle of 
racism and authoritarianism more than developing strategic plans offer only symbolic 
compensations for austerity. As I write, Italy’s new government is promising an end to 
austerity, not because it means to follow through on this, but in order to have a symbolic 
confrontation with the EU’s budget rules.  
In these contexts, we might say, we have seen something like the GDR’s two 1989s: our 
movements were able to provoke a crisis of hegemony, but what filled the space we opened 
was a mobilisation from above. This new right mimics the forms of grassroots mobilisation but 
its racist “common sense” (in Gramsci’s meaning, too) is shaped by mainstream media, the 
agencies of the security state, the anti-refugee politicians (social democratic as much as 
Christian democratic) of the old era, and the most xenophobic elements of popular culture. 
Racism, in this context, is not even primarily about migrants or refugees: it is about putting this 
old wine in new bottles. The far right does not represent a new economic or social strategy or 
direction, but an attempt to keep the show on the road at any cost. 
On Europe’s western and southern periphery, however, there is a different kind of crisis, one 
where there is no popular majority for the politics of austerity or neoliberalism. Strong left 
movements have created a situation where regular breaches in formal legitimacy are required 
to maintain austerity (rerunning referenda, twisting the arms of elected governments, installing 
technical governments, the Portuguese presidential veto on left-wing measures and the Greek 
tragedy of 2015), and in effect the periphery is ruled under the sign of a constant state of 
exception. 
In neither Europe is there as yet any sign of a stable resolution which could bring a broad 
popular consent behind a new strategic direction. There are no real equivalents of the 1970s 
neoliberals waiting in the wings; as in the 1920s, we see instead fascism expressing this crisis 
of consent and an old order flailing around to maintain itself by coercion if necessary. Of 
course, as history tells us, the smile is likely to wind up being on the face of the tiger. 
From above we are seeing a period of experimentation, in other words “making it up as they 
go along”: Trump and Brexit on the one hand; the increasing paralysis of EU institutions on 
the other; authoritarian leaders exploring how far they can push the dynamic of centralising 
power and radicalising hatred against internal opposition and ethnic Others (an experiment also 
happening outside Europe, in states as different as India, Turkey and Brazil).  
From below, we have seen a long period of movements against neoliberalism seeking an 
adequate form: from summit protests and social forums via “squares” and new parties to 
Blockupy, Altersummit, DiEM25 etc. and now the Gilets Jaunes. Most of these, necessarily, 
privilege some form of alliance-building or attempt at developing what might be called a proto-
hegemony. If they have not, as yet, found a convincing and sustainable strategy, they have not 
lost either. The outcome has not yet been written. 
What the experience of 1968 suggests for our present period is that it is not the form of popular 
organisation that constitutes the crisis for power: in 1968 capitalism, the state, imperialism, 
patriarchy and racism were challenged in very many ways by struggles with very different 
ideologies and modes of organising. It is not that the form of organisation does not matter: it is 
rather that it is not an adequate explanation for outcomes. What is key is popular participation, 
which takes different forms in different countries, with their own different movement 
landscapes. Form matters, here, in its recognisability to newly-mobilising groups both as 
meaningful and as being significantly different from existing forms; this is part of what gives 
reason to hope that mobilising in this way, through these organisations or with these allies will 
make a difference. 
The logic of this analysis for radical activists today is that we should not be seeking to form 
our new alliances with other groups as they are: we do not need, for example, to attribute 
nationalism to popular groups and seek to adopt it. What we need to do is to find our 
interlocutors in those other groups and develop strategies through which we can act together to 
construct a broader popular front “from below” (ie on a genuinely participatory basis) as much 
as possible.  
The genius of 1968, and of any genuine period of revolutionary upsurge, is expressed in the 
sounds of many different popular groups finding a new voice, finding their voice for the first 
time, or finding it after a long period of silence. What that voice will be, in a new setting, cannot 
be known in advance, either from outside or from within the group’s existing culture: it is, 
precisely, emergent. What activists can do is to help amplify those voices and draw them into 
serious and practical conversation about how to make a different world than the one that the 
right seeks to force on us. 
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